As Nicholas Murray, the President of Columbia University once famously said "the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern times". Quoted in WP Hackney and TG Benson, "Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital" (1982) 43 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 837, 841 (footnotes omitted). 10 Eg, it was argued by one early scholar that since corporation is an "extraordinary privilege", it "must be used for legitimate business purposes and must not be perverted … and, just as night follows day, so the courts should and will disregard this fi ction 'when it is urged for an intent or purpose not within its reason and policy'". M Wormser, Disregard of the Corporate Fiction and Allied Corporation Problems (Baker, Voorhis and Co., 1927), 8-9, quoted in Presser, supra n 6, 35. See H Hansmann and R Kraakman, "Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts" (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1879, calling for the abolition of limited liability in tort cases. See supra n 14 for suggestion to abolish veil piercing.
The Applicable Law Question Is Common in Piercing Cases
At an early stage of corporate history in the US, corporations were the products of state legislation. 20 Corporations were granted corporate charters by the legislature of the state in which they were expected to operate. 21 With the emergence of national corporations, even the headquarters of the big corporations might not be located in the state of incorporation as they seek to benefi t from favourable corporate laws from certain corporate-friendly states, 22 most notably Delaware. Another signifi cant development is the rise of the parentsubsidiary structure. Taking advantage of limited liability, corporations have created subsidiaries to conduct business in different states.
The natural consequence of this common practice of out-of-state holding corporations utilising subsidiaries (whether incorporated domestically or out-ofstate) is the potential applicable law issue in piercing the corporate veil. The case of National Gear & Piston, Inc v Cummins Power Systems, LLC 23 provides a good example. In this case, the New York court was faced with a contract dispute between a New York incorporated plaintiff and a Delaware incorporated defendant. The contract in question was governed by New York law. The New York plaintiff sought to pierce the corporate veil of the Delaware defendant in order to make the Indiana incorporated parent liable. 24 This case therefore involved the law of three jurisdictions, namely New York (being the law of the forum, the law of incorporation of the plaintiff as well as the law of the contract), Delaware (the law of the state of incorporation of the defendant) and Indiana (the law of the state of incorporation of the parent). The court applied Delaware law for the piercing issue. 20 See SB Presser, An Introduction to the Law of Business Organizations (West, 3rd edn, 2010), 79: "After the American Revolution, it was commonly understood that the power to grant corporate charters … was possessed in America solely by the state legislature". 21 
Ibid.
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See Presser, supra n 20, 80-81. 23 861 F Supp 2d 344 (SDNY 2012). 24 Ibid.
25
Ibid. As Table 1 shows, the fact that a piercing case is governed by a particular state law seems to have a signifi cant bearing on the chances of success of the plaintiff. According to the data from both studies, the plaintiff in National Gear v Cummins had a higher chance of success in piercing the corporate veil with the issue being governed by Indiana law (over 60%) than New York law or Delaware law. Both Thompson and Oh identify this variation among the laws of different jurisdictions; however, Thompson states that it is not certain whether the difference is statistically signifi cant given the small number of cases in some of the states. 28 It is, however, diffi cult to ignore the large number of cases in the key commercial states, 29 such as New York (212 cases in the Thompson study).
30
He is also of the opinion that the competing laws are "essentially the same".
31
Oh does not directly address these points and this indicates a different view on both the issues. He tries to explain the signifi cance by highlighting the difference in the substantive laws of states with a signifi cantly polarised piercing rate. For example, he tries to explain the high piercing rates under North 26 See Thompson study, supra n 15, 1051. 27 See Oh study, supra n 17, 115. 28 See Thompson study, supra n 15, 1050-52: "Given the small number of cases in each jurisdiction, the differences between the states are not statistically signifi cant. Therefore, it is not possible to say with certainty that these results are due to different views of the law." 29 In fact, the table above included the results of eight states highlighted by Professor Thompson himself: see Thompson study, supra n 15, 1050. 30 Ibid. Dakota law (85.71%) and South Dakota law (83.33%) due to both of these laws not requiring proof of fraud in order to pierce the veil. 32 Even though North Dakota law and South Dakota law applied in only seven and six piercing cases, respectively, Oh thinks the data are still of enough signifi cance to merit discussion. 33 Whatever the reason, neither of these two empirical studies provides detailed analysis on the applicable law issue. 34 However, analysis of the state applicable law approaches is essential in the analysis of the aforementioned variation in state substantive laws. Using the example of National Gear v Cummins again, if the plaintiff had wanted to take advantage of the less stringent substantive law of Indiana, she would have needed to understand the circumstances in which a court would apply Indiana law. If the Indiana courts always applied Indiana law, the law of the forum, in a piercing issue, the plaintiff would have then tried to fi le her claim in Indiana. On the other hand, if New York always applied the law of the state of incorporation (Delaware law in this case), the plaintiff would have tried her best to avoid suing in New York.
C. METHODOLOGY
Empirical research has been a mainstay in analysis of piercing the corporate veil since the highly insightful Thompson study. 35 His methodology has been widely adopted in subsequent empirical researches on piercing the corporate veil, including the work of two Wake Forest law students that extended Thompson's research to 1995 (hereinafter the "Wake Forest study"), 36 piercing studies in England and other jurisdictions. 37 It also served as the basis for the aforementioned Oh study. 38 In an effort to extend the empirical research into the area of private international law, this article generally adopts methodology closely resembling that of the Thompson study, subject to appropriate adjustments for its different focus.
32
See Oh study, supra n 17, 116. 33 Ibid.
34
Thompson probably thought that it was not necessary due to the small number of piercing cases in some states as well as the similarities of the substantive laws. See Oh study, supra n 17, 99-100, expanding the cases covered in Westlaw from 1958 up to 2006 and used combinations of two wider search phrases, "pierc! /s veil" and "disregard! /s (entity entities)".
In his article, Thompson uses the search phrases: "piercing the corporate veil" and "disregard! corporate entity", to identify piercing cases. 39 To build on the success of the Thompson study, this article also adopts the same search phrases in identifying piercing cases. 40 This should make this research more amenable to the "market standard" of the majority of the aforementioned researches and provide a more user-friendly database for future researchers on the topic. However, this study is different from Thompson's methodology in two respects. Firstly, the current research is limited to cases decided by US courts in 2012. This limitation will certainly have an impact on the conclusiveness of the fi ndings. However, the focus on 2012 cases will allow the article to be centred on the contemporary practice of the courts and identify trends that have a greater impact on current piercing analysis. The goal here is not to provide a full account of the historical development of the law but to provide a snapshot of recent practice. In addition, as will be shown below, the number of piercing cases in 2012 is signifi cant enough to allow for meaningful analysis. 41 Second, since this article focuses on the applicable law in piercing the corporate veil, there is a special focus on analysing "confl ict cases". In this article, the term "confl ict cases" refers to cases that have a signifi cant relationship to more than one state, 42 most notably those involving an out-of-state corporation, an out-of-state parent corporation, or a contract governed by foreign law. 43 As long as the case involves such a foreign element, it will be regarded as a confl ict case. In contrast, "non-confl ict cases" do not involve any foreign element and are therefore purely domestic.
Another important term in this article is "international cases". These refer to those "confl ict cases" with international, or more precisely non-US, elements. 44 For example, instead of a Delaware corporation being sued in New York, an international case might involve a Hong Kong corporation being sued 39 See Thompson study, supra n 15, 1036 and n 1. Thompson also used four undisclosed key numbers. 40 It is noted that other commentators have adopted broader search phrases, eg those of the Oh study, supra n 17. However, it is not clear to what extent such search phrases have improved the quality of the research. The most obvious advantage of the broader search phrases is their apparent ability to uncover relevant cases. However, over the same time period, Oh actually uncovered fewer cases (1,415) than Thompson did (1,583) and Oh offered no explanation for this. See Oh study, supra n 17, 109. Having regard to the above, it is decided that the familiarity of the proven Thompson methodology outweighs any marginal benefi ts brought by the broader search phrases. 41 The number of cases surveyed herein is rather substantial, see infra Section D.1.
42
This defi nition is derived from § 2 of the Second Restatement: "Confl ict of Laws is that part of the law of each state which determines what effect is given to the fact that the case may have a signifi cant relationship to more than one state." 43 This is not an exhaustive list. However, in practice, these are the most commonly found foreign elements in the cases. 44 Thus, "international cases" are always "confl ict cases," but not vice versa.
in New York instead. These cases are signifi cant in illustrating the need for better applicable law rules in international piercing cases.
One of the biggest fi ndings of the Thompson study is that the success rate of veil piercing is higher in contract cases than in tort cases. 45 While this substantive aspect of piercing will not be examined in this article, the categorisation of contract and tort cases is still important to illustrate the opportunity for pretransaction bargaining between the parties 46 and the rarity of tort cases. 47 Thus, the article adopts the same categorisation as in the Thompson study. 48 In this article, "contract case" refers to a case arising from a voluntary transaction, while "tort case" refers to a case arising from an involuntary transaction. It is possible that a plaintiff can raise both contract and tort claims in certain cases. When that happens, such cases will be categorised based on the nature of the underlying transaction. If the underlying transaction is voluntary, it will be categorised as a contract case despite involving a tort claim, and vice versa. These two categories are subject to the category of "statute" cases, which involve different statutory policies.
49
The last note on methodology relates to its limitation. It is important to treat this article for what it is. Apart from its limited scope to the 2012 cases, like the empirical researches by Thompson and Oh, 50 this study is subject to selection bias, ie "disputes selected for litigation (as opposed to settlement) will constitute neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes". 51 However, as will be shown below in the fi ndings, the applicable law 45 See Thompson study, supra n 15, 1058. This fi nding is disputed by Oh, see Oh study, supra n 17, 127.
46
See infra Section F.3(a).
47
Ibid.
48
It is noted that Oh has created another category in his study: "fraud". However, since Oh created that category mainly to cater to the explanation of the substantive tort/contract asymmetry, this article does not adopt it (Oh study, supra n 17 rules adopted by the courts are far from clear. 52 Like Thompson's response to selection bias in his research on the substantive law, this uncertainty on applicable law should mitigate the selection bias to some extent as it limits litigants' knowledge from prior cases and their ability to apply "that knowledge to decide which cases to fi le, to continue on appeal, or to settle".
53
D. FEATURES OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
Applicable law rules shall be tailored to the needs of the corresponding substantive law in order for them to be effective. 54 It is therefore necessary to understand the substantive piercing law before we turn to the applicable law aspect in Section E. Seven distinctive features of the substantive law of piercing the corporate veil are identifi ed based on the empirical research. See Oh study, supra n 17, 109 and Table 2. respectively. Thus, the 2012 data continue to show the signifi cance of piercing the corporate veil. Table 2 also indicates the high percentage of confl ict cases and international cases among piercing cases. More than 60% of piercing cases are confl ict cases, involving either an out-of-state party or non-forum law. Among these confl ict cases, about a quarter of them are international cases, involving a non-US party or a non-US law. This is a clear indication of the need to study applicable law, as well as other private international law aspects, in relation to piercing the corporate veil. In 2012, the overall piercing rate of all piercing cases was 33.24%. This is lower than, but still in line with, the piercing rate previously measured by Thompson, of about 40%. 60 However, it is substantially lower than the 48% piercing rate in Oh's research. 61 This seems to suggest that courts in general are growing more cautious in piercing the corporate veil just as more plaintiffs are seeking to utilise this judicial remedy. The piercing rate of the confl ict cases at 35.96% is also in line with the overall piercing rate, while international cases have a lower piercing rate at 28.30%.
Continued Significance and Internationalisation of Piercing the Corporate Veil
62
Even though only about one-third of the piercing cases resulted in successful piercing, it is still a rather high fi gure considering how piercing the corporate veil has been consistently described as a "rare exception". 63 Limited liability has always been the norm. As Justice Breyer of the US Supreme Court said in United States v Bestfoods:
64 "It is a general principle of corporate law deeply 'ingrained in our economic and legal systems' that a parent corporation … is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries." 65 The prevailing rationale for the existence of limited liability is its alleged impact in promoting investment. 66 Thus, even if the law has long recognised the need to create a "safety valve" to reduce the abuse, " [o] rdinarily the corporate veil is pierced only under exceptional circumstances". 67 One way to explain the anomaly of the rather high piercing rate is selection bias. 68 However, it is possible that the success rates described above might not convey the meaning of what one might think. Neither the Thompson study nor the Oh study explains how they treat a piercing case as being successful.
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See Thompson study, supra n 15, 1048.
61
See Oh study, supra n 17, 115 and Table 6 . 62 Due to jurisdictional piercing, which will be discussed below, see infra Section D.7. As is common in litigation practice in the US, the defendants' fi rst line of defence is usually in the form of motion to dismiss 69 and summary judgment.
70
The number of cases actually getting to trial is relatively small. 71 If we were to include only successful piercing cases in summary judgment (by the plaintiff), trial and appeal stages, the piercing rate would fall from 33.23% to 20.29%. Such a piercing rate is more in line with the general perception of piercing the corporate veil as a rare exception. This suggests that both the Thompson and Oh studies adopted a wider defi nition for successful piercing. 72 However, the narrower defi nition of successful piercing is probably what most readers had in mind when they fi rst read the Thompson and Oh studies. The substantive law on piercing the corporate veil is a matter for state corporate law and each forum state therefore applies their respective piercing rules on piercing the corporate veil. 73 As some of the states have very few cases decided under their laws, the piercing rates thereof might not be statistically signifi cant. However, the top eight legal systems (highlighted in bold) account for more than 50% of all piercing cases, with none of them having less than 13 cases.
Different States Have Different Rules
The fi rst point to make about Table 6 is the variation of piercing rates between states. New York remains the state with the most piercing cases decided under its law, accounting for 13.08% of all piercing cases. 74 This is hardly surprising considering that this was also the case for the Thompson and Oh studies. 75 However, what is surprising about New York law is its high piercing rate (51.11%) compared with the average piercing rate (33.24%). Not only is that piercing rate the highest among the top eight legal systems, it is also higher than the piercing rates in New York recorded in both the Thompson (34.91%) 76 and Oh studies (49.81%).
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The most surprising state law is Delaware, both for the amount of piercing cases decided under that law and the piercing rate. Traditionally, it has been thought that Delaware, as a state with favourable corporate law, would be reluctant to pierce the corporate veil, 78 thus leading to a strict piercing law and few piercing litigations thereunder. However, in terms of both percentage of piercing cases and piercing rate, Delaware law is higher than average. In See supra Section D.3, Table 6 . 75 New York law is the state law with the most cases in both the Thompson study (accounting for 13.39% of all cases), see Thompson study, supra n 15, 1051 and Table 6 , and the Oh Study (accounting for 9.18% of all cases), see Oh study, supra n 17, 115 and Table 6 . 76 See Thompson study, supra n 15, 1051 and Table 6 . 77 See Oh study, supra n 17, 115 and fact, of the top eight legal systems in this study Delaware has the second highest piercing rate (37.50%), trailing only the aforementioned New York law. This is a big contrast to the fi nding of the Thompson study where no piercing case had ever been successful under Delaware law. 79 In contrast to the 16 piercing cases litigated under Delaware law in 2012, there were only 11 cases through 1985 reported in the Thompson study. 80 There has not been any groundbreaking change in the tests adopted under either New York or Delaware law in 2012 or in recent years so the underlying reason for this increase in piercing rate remains unclear. This may suggest that the laws of these prominent corporate states are now more likely to lead to the piercing of the corporate veil than other US legal systems. In addition, it is noted that the increase in piercing rate coincides with an increase in piercing cases litigated under these states' laws. Perhaps this is a result of forum shopping as plaintiffs have started to take advantage of the higher rate of success. It will be interesting to see if this trend of a higher rate of piercing continues under both states' laws.
Cases decided under federal common law are not technically "state law"; however, it is every bit as important. Not only does it account for 8.72% of all piercing cases, it is substantially different in nature according to some commentators. They have argued that federal common law should look to federal statutory policy in piercing rather than apply factors under traditional state law tests mechanically, particularly the requirement for fraud. 81 The corollary of this view is that it may be easier to pierce the veil if the case is governed by federal common law. 82 However, this view is not supported by the data in this study as the piercing rate for federal common law is lower than the average piercing rate. In addition, this allegedly lower standard of federal piercing has been seriously challenged by Presser as not being supported by the US Supreme Court's authorities. 83 While this article does not intend to resolve the controversy surrounding this substantive aspect of the federal common law, it does show the potential for forum shopping.
Another important fi nding is the lack of application of non-US law. With 51 international cases, it is shocking that there was not even one case applying any non-US law. This is consistent with the Thompson and Oh studies where 79 See Thompson study, supra n 15, 1051 and Table 6 . The Delaware law piercing rate is 34.29% in the Oh study, though it is still substantially lower than the average piercing rate. See Oh study, supra n 17, 115 and Table 6 . 80 Ibid. The Oh study has 35 cases though they represent all cases decided under Delaware law between 1866 and 2006. See Oh study, supra n 17, 115 and Table 6 . 81 See Harvard Note, supra n 5, 865-71. 82 See Presser, supra n 6, 1011, n 5. 83 Presser reviewed a number of Supreme Court authorities to illustrate the lack of support for the lower standard. Ibid, 1010-43. there was no category made for any non-US law. 84 This suggests that the US courts have been extremely reluctant to apply foreign law to piercing issues. 
Similarities Between State Laws Are Limited
Despite the differences in substantive piercing law between states, efforts have been made to identify their similarities. In particular, Warren identifi es a common three-prong test 86 which is restated by Presser as follows:
" (1) [T]he 'alter ego,' or 'mere instrumentality' test, requiring that the subsidiary be completely under the control and domination of the parent, (2) the 'fraud or wrong' or 'injustice' test, requiring that the defendant parent's conduct in using the subsidiary have been somehow unjust, fraudulent, or wrongful towards the plaintiff, and (3) the 'unjust loss or injury' test, requiring that the plaintiff actually have suffered some harm as a result of the conduct of the defendant parent." 87 First, the control exerted by the shareholders must be so excessive that it amounts to the total domination of the corporation. 88 One court described the level of control as such that "the controlled corporation acted robot or puppetlike in mechanical response to the controller's tugs on its strings or pressure on its buttons". 89 Second, the plaintiff in a piercing case must articulate how "the observance of the corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow". 90 Finally, the said fraud or injustice must be proximately caused by the excessive control. 91 Only when all three prongs are present would a court pierce the corporate veil.
At fi rst glance, many jurisdictions have formulated their piercing laws based on this common test.
92 If the tests adopted by different jurisdictions are substantially the same, then there is probably no need to examine the applicable law rules. 93 In private international law terms this is known as a "false confl ict".
94
In fact, it is not uncommon for courts to decline applicable law analysis on the piercing issue on this basis. 95 If there is a general uniformity in the substan-
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See Thompson study, supra n 15, 1051 and Table 6 ; Oh study, supra n 17, 115 and tive tests adopted under state law, it may be questioned that the variation of piercing rates highlighted in Table 6 should be attributed to states having their own piercing rules. However, the actual tests adopted by state courts show substantial variations. Table 7 shows the popular formulations of the piercing test among the 2012 cases. The classic three-prong test with all control, fraud and proximity prongs accounts for only 13.82% of all formulas. However, it must be noted that the third prong on proximity is often implicitly included in the test. 96 If we include these "implied third prong" cases, the traditional three-prong test represents 21.76% of all formulas. Further, the difference between the two-prong control and fraud test and the traditional three-prong test is small. If both excessive control and fraud are found, they are usually proximately related. Thus, it is extremely rare for a court to reject piercing simply based on the lack of proximity. 97 If we are to combine these three aforementioned formulas, they account for the majority of formulations (57.35%).
However, the "outliers" still combine to make up 42.65% and so cannot be overlooked. The key difference in these outliers is the omission of either one of the control or fraud factors. 3.82% of cases just require control, while 5.88% of cases just require fraud. Together, 10.59% of cases only require either one of the two elements. Thus, while Warren's observation on the common elements is indeed correct, courts have not been consistent in requiring all three elements. 98 In addition, the court would usually add that the factors on the list were not exclusive and it was not necessary for all the factors to be present. 100 Among the factors listed, most factors deal with the control element, such as factors 1-11 in Att'y Gen v MCK, Inc above. However, the listing of fraud factors has not been consistent. 6.47% of all formulas adopt laundry lists with both control and fraud elements, while 4.71% adopt laundry lists with only control but not the fraud element. Some may claim that at least the laundry list with both control and fraud fi t into the traditional three-prong test. 101 However, in most cases, courts adopting the laundry list do not make clear whether both the control and fraud elements are required.
In addition, 20.88% of all cases do not even set forth a test or the piercing scenarios make it inappropriate to adopt the traditional three-prong test. For the latter cases, the prime example is the reverse piercing cases where the plaintiff tried to pierce the parent corporation's veil in order to make the subsidiary liable. In some jurisdictions, they do not allow reverse piercing at all.
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In short, due to the different views on the necessity of control and fraud among different courts, the uncertainty of laundry lists and even the lack of any test in some cases, the differences in the formulas are great enough to make applicable law signifi cant.
The international cases are also powerful evidence that the courts could not afford to treat all piercing laws as the same. The closest piercing law to that of the US is probably the English piercing law. However, even the US judges agree that the English law is not that similar if one is looks at it more close- ly. 103 Accordingly, considering the signifi cant number of international cases, it is impossible for the courts not to establish a proper applicable law approach.
Discretionary Nature
Inconsistent formula is one thing but variation of piercing rates could also be attributed to the highly discretionary nature of the application of those formulas. Table 8 shows which elements the courts actually analyzed in deciding piercing cases. Lord Sumption summarises the law at para 35 as follows: " I conclude that there is a limited principle of English law which applies when a person is under an existing legal obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under his control. The court may then pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and only for the purpose, of depriving the company or its controller of the advantage that they would otherwise have obtained by the company's separate legal personality. The principle is properly described as a limited one, because in almost every case where the test is satisfi ed, the facts will in practice disclose a legal relationship between the company and its controller which will make it unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil." The principles he has established for piercing the corporate veil are clearly very different from the "three-pronged" test widely used in the US. 104 There are 102 such cases. 105 There are 111 such cases.
formally adopting a one factor test. 106 Similarly, the "no application" cases (29.12%) are also more than the no formula cases (20.88). This analysis shows that, despite adopting a particular test, the courts do not consistently apply the test to the facts of the case.
It is true that, in some cases, particularly when the court is rejecting a piercing claim, it is unnecessary to apply the full three-prong test. This is because failing one element will automatically doom the plaintiff 's case. However, the reverse cannot be true when courts pierce the corporate veil under a three-prong test simply on the basis of either control or fraud. Perhaps one explanation for such cases is that some courts equate excessive control with fraud, 107 or that courts simply imply that there is excessive control when they fi nd fraud. This brings us to the next point, ie the wide discretion available to courts in interpreting what constitutes excessive control or fraud.
For the control prong, some courts demand a very high level of control, so high that it takes a "complete domination, not only of the fi nances, but of policy and business practice in respect to the transaction so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separate mind, will or existence of its own", 108 while some only require a "degree of control … greater than that normally associated with ownership and directorship". 109 This indicates the potential disparity among different states in deciding this prong. More specifically, observing corporate formality as a factor for the control prong might be a serious factor for some states 110 but not a factor at all in others.
111
The interpretation of the "fraud" prong might be even more troublesome. For many jurisdictions, the requirement of fraud has been lowered to some form of injustice without requiring "actual fraud". 112 However, courts have plenty of room to draw the line on what this injustice could be beyond "actual fraud". For example, undercapitalisation has been regarded as suffi cient in some 113 The high level of discretion given to the court is simply by design having regard to the equitable nature of piercing the corporate veil. It has been declared repeatedly that " [v] eil piercing is an equitable remedy". 116 As a result, the court "takes a fl exible fact-specifi c approach focusing on equity" 117 in deciding piercing cases and the related analysis is therefore "an intensively fact specifi c activity, and highly dependent upon the equities of the situation".
118
That said, it is one thing for the court to exercise discretion within the structure of the law but it is quite another thing to be arbitrary, such as to bypass specifying the proper test 119 or to pierce the corporate veil without carefully weighing each of the required components. 120 As we have seen the courts routinely do behave arbitrarily in piercing cases.
Ancillary Nature
What makes piercing the corporate veil a particular challenge for the court is the seemingly unlimited types of cases in which piercing is involved. Piercing the corporate veil is not by itself a cause of action.
121 Instead, as mentioned above, it is a type of remedy available to the successful plaintiff under equity. The underlying liability must be created by the cause of action brought by the plaintiff, be it contract, tort or any other statutory creations. Technically, the plaintiff must succeed in the underlying cause of action, such as proof of breach of contract by the defendant corporation, before the court needs to examine whether it should pierce the veil.
122 Table 9 shows the underlying causes of actions of the piercing cases. Tort cases remain rarely litigated on the issue of piercing the corporate veil, accounting for just 8.82% of the piercing cases. In addition, similar to the fi ndings of Thompson, tort cases are paradoxically diffi cult to pierce compared with contract cases. 123 It has long been argued that the lack of opportunity for tort victims to deal with the corporation that eventually was unable to pay its obligation should make the courts more willing to pierce the corporate veil. 124 Although it is not the purpose of this article to explain the paradox, the tortcontract relationship will similarly have a bearing in formulating the proper applicable law rules. 
Jurisdictional Piercing/Enforcement Piercing
Piercing the corporate veil as a concept has been used beyond the context of liability. Traditionally, piercing is just a way to make shareholders liable for the debt of the corporation (hereinafter "liability piercing"). However, piercing has also been used in a jurisdictional context, a situation whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over a shareholder of the defendant corporation through veil piercing. For example, many big corporations do business in states other than the one where its headquarters are situated by setting up subsidiaries incorporated locally. Given that most of these parents do not do business directly in the forum state, the only formal connection with the state is its shareholding over the local subsidiary. In order to acquire jurisdiction over the out-of-state parent, the plaintiff could try to pierce the corporate veil of the local subsidiary and impute the connections of the subsidiary with the state to the parent. This is sometimes called "jurisdictional veil-piercing", 126 or "procedural piercing".
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Another possible way to apply the piercing concept beyond liability is in the context of enforcement. For example, the plaintiff has secured a judgment over the defendant corporation in State A. However, instead of trying to sue the parent in State A through piercing the corporate veil, the plaintiff tries to enforce State A's judgment against the parent corporation in its state of incorporation by piercing the corporate veil. Thus, the distinction from the 123 See Thompson study, supra n 15, 1058-59 and traditional liability piercing is the stage at which piercing is used. It is not at the trial stage but at the enforcement stage.
Both jurisdictional piercing and enforcement piercing bring in rather different considerations to those found in the traditional liability-oriented piercing. While the applicable law aspects of these two types of piercing will not be examined in detail, it is important to note the existence of these different piercing cases in order to properly address the applicable law issues for liability based piercing. Table 10 shows the piercing rates among jurisdictional piercing, enforcement piercing and liability piercing. The success rate of jurisdictional piercing is much lower than liability piercing. 128 On the other hand, the number of enforcement piercing cases is not statistically signifi cant enough to draw any meaningful observation.
129
E. APPLICABLE LAW RULES
By surveying the applicable law approaches among different states on piercing the corporate veil, it is clear that there are four commonly used approaches. This section will briefl y introduce each of these approaches and the empirical fi ndings will then be presented and discussed.
The Law of the Place of Incorporation
The "internal affairs" rule is the approach most thought to be the proper approach to follow by the courts and academics. 130 In essence, the internal affairs rule requires that a state court should as a general rule defer to the state of incorporation on matters relating to the management of the internal 128 While jurisdictional piercing is not the focus of this article, it is a worthwhile topic in its own right. The reason for the lower piercing rate probably has a lot to do with the need to satisfy due process. 129 affairs of a corporation. 131 Perhaps the most cited provision in support of this approach is section 307 of the Second Restatement which states that:
"The local law of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine the existence and extent of a shareholder's liability to the corporation for assessments or contributions and to its creditors for corporate debts."
132
At fi rst glance, section 307 seems to cover piercing the corporate veil. However, it is important to fully understand the rationale behind the Second Restatement position. In Dassault Falcon Jet Corp v Oberfl ex, Inc, 133 when dealing with the choice-of-law issue on piercing for the fi rst time in North Carolina, the court explained why section 307 was supported by "sound policy reasons". 134 First, it looked at the piercing issue as part of the concept of limited liability. Thus, it would be reasonable to adopt the law of the state of incorporation due to its "greater interest in determining when and if that insulation is to be stripped away". 135 Second, the court highlighted the benefi ts of "consistency and predictability to the corporation and its shareholders". 136 Finally, the court cited cases from other states as evidence that the internal affairs rule was one adopted by "most, if not all, jurisdictions".
137
That said, the use of this approach is not without challenges. The fi rst argument against the internal affairs rule as an applicable law rule relates to corporate issues in general. The lack of connections between the law of the place of incorporation and the issue being litigated in the modern business world suggest the need for a better approach. 138 Secondly, it has been argued that the Second Restatement does not actually support the application of the internal affairs rule to veil piercing. The argument is that section 307 and its comments do not defi ne the phrase "corporate debts" clearly and, having regard to the context of section 307, only covers those circumstances where a shareholder has not fully satisfi ed his assessment responsibilities or contribu- tion to corporate capital obligations. 139 Finally, there is also a challenge as to whether the internal affairs rule is appropriate in regard to piercing the corporate veil due, in particular, to the involvement of a non-corporate insider.
140
In short, it is an applicable law approach that presumably applies but comes with a lot of uncertainties.
The Law of the Forum
The second potential approach is the law of the forum. However, it is diffi cult to see much offi cial support for this approach in traditional liability piercing. For example, in SEC v Vassallo, 141 despite the court recognising that the proper approach was the law of the forum, 142 this same approach was doubted by the court later in the same judgment, saying that "although [the precedents] state the rule without reservations, it appears that in both cases the forum state was also the state of incorporation. It is not clear that the same rule would apply if the states were different".
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The apparent advantage of applying the law of the forum is convenience. The court certainly knows its own law the best. In addition, like the law of the state of incorporation, it also comes with certainty. However, the disadvantage is also as apparent. Like the law of the state of incorporation, the connection between the law of the forum and the issue might be rather weak. Further, one automatic response to applying the law of the forum is the potential for forum shopping. One could also argue that a rule on remedy is a procedural rule and should therefore be governed by the law of the forum. However, it does not seem to be a strong argument. Firstly, the First Restatement sets forth an exhaustive list of procedural matters but that does not include piercing the corporate veil.
144 Secondly, the Second Restatement takes a more liberal approach and states that courts usually apply the lex fori which prescribes "how litigation shall be conducted". 145 However, despite being termed a "remedy", the rule of piercing the corporate veil in fact looks at the parent's conduct outside the court prior to the litigation. By analogy, heads of damages are regarded as substantive by the Second Restatement. 142 Ibid, 3: "'We apply the law of the forum state in determining whether a corporation is an alter ego' of an individual." 143 Ibid. 144 First Restatement, supra n 6, § § 586-620. 145 Second Restatement, supra n 132, § 122. 146 Ibid, § 178.
The Law of the Underlying Claim
As mentioned in Section D.6, piercing the corporate veil is ancillary to the underlying claim being litigated. The private international law concept of dépeçage is usually applied in this case, ie the rules of different states are applied in order to determine different issues. 147 This means that the court will conduct separate applicable law analyses on the underlying claim and the piercing issue.
148 However, applying the governing law of the underlying transaction to the piercing issue seems to guarantee a connection between the governing law and the issue being litigated. In addition, if the underlying cause is a statutory claim, it may well involve specifi c considerations particular to the statute that would mandate applying federal common law instead.
A counter-argument to this approach is that it creates inconsistency in the applicable law issue for piercing the corporate veil. Thus, if a corporation is sued on both tort and contract claims, the veil-piercing issue might be subject to two different substantive laws assuming the applicable law rules for the tort and contract issues are different.
The Law with the Most Significant Relationship
This approach is the general approach to applicable law under the Second Restatement. 149 Its advantage is that, at least theoretically, the applicable law will have the most signifi cant relationship with the parties and the dispute.
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As a result, it prevents ex ante forum shopping by founders of the corporations. It is for this reason that some commentators have argued that this approach should replace the law of incorporation as the prevailing rule.
151
On the other hand, while it looks good on paper, it is the most diffi cult one to apply in practice due to its uncertainty. As we have seen in the uneven application in the substantive piercing law by the courts, the same uneven application could also appear in the determination of the applicable law process if this approach were to be adopted. Table 11 shows the extent to which the aforementioned approaches have been adopted by the courts. The number that stands out is the large number of cases without a specifi ed approach. There are 185 such cases, accounting for 73.12% of all confl ict cases.
152 Thus, most courts in a confl ict case will not conduct an applicable law analysis for the piercing issue.
The category "others" includes cases in which the courts specifi ed an approach but did not then apply it due to other reasons, such as the parties failing to plead the substantive law, positively waving the confl ict point, or simply avoiding the question by declaring the two potential governing laws as the same. If these cases are included on top of the cases with no specifi ed approach, then the cases with no approach applied increases to 78.26%.
Of the remaining 21.74% of confl ict cases, the approaches adopted varied. Twenty-one cases adopted the law of the state of incorporation, accounting for 8.30%. Sixteen cases adopted the law of the forum, accounting for 6.32%. Finally, 15 cases adopted the law of the underlying claim, accounting for 5.93%. Therefore, while we may still claim that the law of incorporation is the most selected approach in cases that have applied an approach, it is hardly the dominating approach as has been presumed traditionally. Finally, there are very few cases adopting the law of the most signifi cant relationship, accounting for only 1.19%.
From the survey above, we can therefore derive three key questions:
(a) Why are courts so reluctant to specify an applicable law approach? (b) For courts which specify an approach, why opt for approaches other than the law of the state of incorporation? (c) Why did the law of most signifi cant relationship receive so little support in practice?
(a) Reluctance in Specifying an Applicable Law Approach
The fact that a court does not specify an approach in the judgment does not mean that it did not choose a substantive law in practice. In fact, it would have to apply a substantive law in any event to decide the piercing issue. Table 12 shows the substantive law applied by courts in practice. Unlike Table 11 , which shows only 6.32% of cases specifying the law of the forum as the applicable law approach, the law of the forum is clearly the dominant approach in reality, accounting for more than 90% of the actual law being applied. With no approach being specifi ed and the law of the forum being applied implicitly, the determination of the applicable law on piercing the corporate veil is really a choice with no choice. Table 13 compares the piercing rates of cases decided by different state courts and piercing rates of different state laws as displayed in Table 6 above. Not surprisingly, since most courts implicitly choose the law of the forum, the piercing rates of state courts mirror those of state laws. In fact, of the top eight legal systems with the most piercing cases, discussed previously in Table 6 (again highlighted in bold), 153 the largest difference between the two piercing rates is only 2.81% in Illinois. Thus, there could be a great motivation to engage in forum shopping.
The reluctance of the courts to specify the law of the forum as the proper applicable law rule must relate to the lack of a strong basis to offi cially endorse the law of the forum. The obvious weaknesses of the law of the forum as an approach are the lack of connections between the forum law and the underlying case, as well as the likelihood of forum shopping. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that more than 90% of the courts across the US are reluctant to fulfi l their responsibilities and ignore the legitimate rights of the litigants to have the correct applicable law applied.
Another explanation is that the courts view the substantive piercing laws of different states as substantively the same. However, as we have seen in Section D, the state laws might not be as similar as they look at fi rst glance, and this assumption certainly does not apply at all in the international cases. 154 An incorrect perception of the similarity of the laws therefore might be the reason.
Finally, the reason may lie in the discretionary nature of piercing the corporate veil. As discussed in Section D, piercing the corporate veil is highly discretionary no matter which state law is applied. 155 The discretionary nature is by design in order to offer equity in the appropriate cases. When judges are faced with a piercing case, they might have reached a conclusion in their minds as to whether it is a worthwhile case to pierce the corporate veil. It is from that conclusion that they work back to the governing law issue. If they think the case merits piercing the corporate veil, they would try to fi gure out a way to circumvent the governing law as it might lead to a contrary result. Applying the law of forum here is the easiest choice as the law of the forum, no matter the formula, allows substantial fl exibility in the discretion of the forum courts. From this perspective, the courts apply the law of the forum not because of their ignorance of parties' interests but because of their insistence in offering ultimate equity to the parties.
(b) Why Not the Law of Incorporation?
This question is partly answered by the analysis above. If courts want to bypass the determination of the applicable law due to the want of fl exibility, this simply implies that adopting the law of the state of incorporation could lead to rigid and unreasonable results.
On the other hand, it still does not explain why the law of the forum (as a specifi ed approach) and the law of the underlying transaction are as popular as the law of incorporation among courts which believe in the need to specify an applicable law approach. There is therefore a need to examine the types of cases adopting these three different approaches.
(i) Law of Forum A closer look at those cases specifying the law of the forum as the applicable law approach shows that there is little reason for adopting the approach. The exceptions are jurisdictional piercing cases. Four of the 16 law of the forum cases deal with jurisdictional piercing instead of traditional piercing which deals with liability. 156 For jurisdictional purposes, it seems that the courts are justifi ed in applying the law of the forum. Establishing jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant requires satisfying the constitutional due process and the state jurisdiction statute. 157 The constitutional due process is based on the minimum contacts test fi rst developed in the case of International Shoe Co v Washington. 158 This test has been universally adopted by all states in the US. In addition, states can further restrict their own jurisdiction by the use of state jurisdictional statutes. These statutes will of course be applicable, as the law of forum, to the case regardless of the place of incorporation or the underlying claim.
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(ii) Law of the Underlying Claim An examination of the cases that adopted the law of the underlying claim shows gravitation towards federal question cases. Federal question cases account for 10 out of 15 (66.67%) such cases. They are different from normal piercing cases in that the particular statutes may set forth different purposes and thus approaches in piercing the corporate veil. If that is indeed the case upon proper interpretation, it certainly makes sense to apply the law of the under- 156 Ibid. exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant two prerequisites must be satisfi ed. Firstly, the forum state's long arm statute must be satisfi ed. Secondly, the Court must determine whether the defendant has suffi cient contacts with the forum state to satisfy due process concerns of the Fourteenth Amendment." 158 326 US 310 (1945) . 159 What this test should be and its application merit separate discussion beyond this article. There are very few cases of enforcement piercing.
lying transaction because that law, ie, the federal statute, in fact dictates the application of federal common law.
(iii) Law of the State of Incorporation
The law of the state of incorporation mainly deals with the classic piercing cases concerning liability rather than jurisdiction, and is based on common law rather than statutory law. Thus, to say that the law of the state of incorporation is the prevailing approach is not totally wrong considering that among the classic cases of liability with no federal question, the law of incorporation remains the most popular applicable law approach.
(c) Why Isn't the Law of Most Signifi cant Relationship Chosen?
This approach might look good on paper but is diffi cult to apply in practice. The biggest problem is probably the uncertainty associated with the approach. Looking closely at the rare cases adopting this approach, even they might not offer the strongest support for the approach. For example, in Secon Serv Sys v St Joseph Bank & Trust Co, 161 the court claimed to apply the "most intimate contacts" rule under Indiana law to the piercing issue. However, the court did not explain why this applicable law rule which was originally intended for contracts was suitable for a piercing issue.
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F. PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVEMENT
As the survey has shown, more than 90% of piercing cases do not go through an applicable law analysis but instead they quietly choose the law of the forum. Is this such a bad thing considering that the courts could have done this by design in order to maintain maximum discretion? It is submitted that the practice is against procedural justice and a proper applicable law analysis is required. There is a distinction between arbitrariness and discretion. The fact that judges are given considerable leeway does not mean that they can apply whichever substantive law they want. Forgoing the applicable law analysis for convenience is also unreasonable because determining the applicable law is part of the process of defi ning the parties' rights. 163 Thus, the focus of the discussion should be on how this applicable law analysis should be conducted. A three-step approach is suggested: distinguish the underlying issue; apply the 160 See Harvard Note, supra n 5. 161 law of the state of incorporation to the liability issue; and apply the law with the most signifi cant relationship to the exceptional cases.
Distinguish the Underlying Issue
The fi rst step in conducting the applicable law analysis is to distinguish jurisdictional piercing from traditional liability piercing. Recently, the Texas Supreme Court clearly approved this distinction, stating that "veil-piercing for purposes of liability ('substantive veil-piercing') is distinct from imputing one entity's contacts to another for jurisdictional purposes ('jurisdictional veil-piercing')". 164 This is due to "the fact that personal jurisdiction involves due process considerations that may not be overridden by statutes or the common law". 165 Certain academics have also suggested for a long time that liability is a different issue to jurisdiction, and different rules should be applied to each. 166 While this article focuses on the liability side, the current practice of applying the law of the forum to the jurisdiction seems to be the right approach. In Old Orchard Urban Ltd Partnership v Harry Rosen, Inc, the Illinois court held that jurisdiction piercing should be governed by the law of the forum:
"[A]lthough the law of the state of incorporation applies when a party seeks to substantively pierce a corporation's veil, Illinois law governs the analysis where a party uses veil piercing to establish personal jurisdiction." 167 This follows from "the sensible proposition that it is the forum state, not the domiciliary state of a company, that has a valid interest in the jurisdictional reach of the forum state's courts". 
Applying the Law of the State of Incorporation to the Liability Issue
After putting aside the jurisdictional piercing, we should apply a default applicable law rule, the law of the state of incorporation, to the liability piercing. Establishing the law of the state of incorporation as a default rule has strong theoretical and practical underpinnings. In theory, while the nexus of the state of incorporation with the litigation varies from case to case, there is a legitimate interest of the state of incorporation to have its law applied to the piercing issue. Although it is true that corporations incorporated in Delaware or New York do business across the nation, it does not mean that the interests 164 169 If the existence of the limited liability of a corporation incorporated by Delaware law is to be generally recognised, 170 it makes sense for Delaware law to govern the abolition of limited liability as well. The real question when piercing an out-of-state corporation lies in whether other states have an overriding interest, and in those exceptional cases, step 3 below will apply.
In most situations, however, it is submitted that the law of incorporation will have a stronger interest. As indicated earlier, contract cases account for the majority of all piercing cases. 171 In these cases, the law of the state of incorporation should be regarded as part of the governing law as plaintiffs entered into the transaction fully aware that they were entering into a contract with a corporation incorporated in a particular state.
172 A choice-of-law clause, properly included in a contract, will generally be given effect by the court 173 and there is no reason why the same rule should not be applicable when it comes to piercing the corporate veil.
While the Second Restatement does not have a specifi c provision on piercing the corporate veil, even the most critical commentator has to admit that it could support a rebuttable presumption for the application of the law of the state of incorporation. 174 In practice, we have also seen that the law of the state of incorporation is indeed the prevailing rule for the liability piercing. Thus, to formally recognise it as the default rule requires the least effort to make any change.
Applying the Law with the Most Significant Relationship to the Exceptional Cases
It must be emphasised that the law of the state of incorporation is to be applied as a default rule subject to exceptions, rather than a mandatory rule as it is used currently by most courts. The fact that most courts have tried to 169 For Delaware's interest in its corporate law in general, see Romano, supra n 8. 170 Second Restatement, supra n 132, § 297. 171 See supra Section D.6. 172 Birbara v Locke, 99 F3d 1233, 1238: "We believe a contract-based relationship, where the parties are plainly identifi ed and their rights and obligations clearly defi ned, is less likely to present the sort of rare situation that calls for corporate disregard in order to prevent gross inequity." 173 Second Restatement, supra n 132, § 187. 174 Crespi, supra n 5, 115: "[S]ection 307 is better read as establishing only, at most, a rebuttable presumption that the law of the state of incorporation should be applied to piercing controversies and that a general choice-of-law analysis should be conducted before this determination is made." circumvent the application of a mandatory rule due to its potential for injustice is ironic for a remedy that aims at offering equity in the fi rst place. Thus, as much as we need to move away from the practice of bypassing the applicable law analysis, there is an equal need to avoid a hard-and-fast mandatory rule. The need for exceptions is loud and clear in Justice Ginsburg's judgment:
"To give conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in determining whether the separate juridical status of its instrumentality should be respected would permit the state to violate with impunity the rights of third parties under international law while effectively insulating itself from liability in foreign courts. We decline to permit such a result."
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It is important to note that she was not saying that the law of the place of incorporation should not be applied as a default rule, only that it should not be a mandatory rule in view of a fraudulent situation having regard to the purpose of piercing the corporate veil in the big picture. In other words, in view of piercing the corporate veil being an equitable remedy that requires consideration of all the factors of the case, it is natural and necessary for the court to create exceptions beyond the default rule. In addition, this presumption and exception structure is already built into the Second Restatement. Section 307 is subject to the exception of section 302 which states that if "some other state has a more signifi cant relationship to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied". 176 Thus, section 307 in fact only provides a rebuttable presumption for the internal affairs rule. 177 There are also cases that have recognised this exception in practice. For example, in Supply Chain Associates, LLC v ACT Electronics, Inc, 178 the court fi rst acknowledged that its default applicable law approach was to apply the law of the state of incorporation, 179 and it was only in exceptional cases where various factors suggested the deviation from the law of the state of incorporation that the court would pierce the corporate veil. 180 After considering that various matters in the case were all related to Massachusetts, the court applied Massachusetts law, the law of the forum, to the piercing issue.
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It takes an exceptional situation for a court to apply the exception. The following part sets forth a number of factors for a court to consider in relation to this. It is important to note, however, that these are not exhaustive and the mere existence of such circumstances should not be conclusive either.
(a) Tort Cases
Tort cases are situations where the courts might be more open to applying an exception. This is based on the tort and contract distinction outlined earlier. 182 The idea is that plaintiffs in tort cases would not have a chance to negotiate with the defendant as to the governing law on the piercing issue since they do not know that they are going to be victims. 183 In any event, given the very few tort cases (only 8.82%) this will not create a wide exception nor render the default rule meaningless.
(b) Statutory Cases
This is not to say that all statutory cases require the application of the exception but only those cases where the relevant statute, expressly or impliedly, specifi es a separate standard for piercing the corporate veil. This exception is different from the traditional argument for the application of federal common law in federal statutory cases. That argument focuses on the presumably overriding federal interests in federal question cases over state corporate interests and proposes a lower standard for piercing the corporate veil. 184 Here, the difference is that its purpose is not to create a separate, hard category for federal cases where federal interests always trump state interests but to confi rm through a case-by-case statutory interpretation whether the relevant statute has formulated its own piercing standard. I expect there to be very few statutes that have provided for a clear cut piercing standard since only 10 out of 126 statutory piercing cases adopted the law of the underlying claim as the applicable law rule.
(c) International Cases
International cases might be the most challenging to the courts because of the way that they deviate from the default rule. The challenge lies in dealing with the variety of piercing laws from different jurisdictions around the world which might or might not share similarities with their counterparts in the US. There are, in fact, jurisdictions without a piercing law that instead rely on other mechanisms to protect creditors. For example, Finland has no piercing law but requires a corporation to have a minimum capital of $50,000 when it is established. The purpose of this minimum capital rule is to ensure that the corporation will have a certain level of assets in order to protect creditors. Due to this ex ante mechanism to protect the creditors, there is, at least, less need to have an ex post mechanism such as veil piercing. 186 On the other hand, Bancec shows that the courts should be willing to deviate from the default rule in the right type of international cases. Justice Ginsburg did this very thing when rejecting the application of Cuban law, the law of incorporation of the Cuban Bank for which piercing was sought. 187 Similarly, in AngioDynamics, Inc v Biolitec AG, the defendant tried to make the shareholder judgment-proof from piercing by attempting a merger between the defendant corporation and a corporation in Austria where US judgments were not enforceable.
(d) Multi-layer Corporation Groups
As mentioned above, multi-layer corporation groups are common and also pose specifi c problems due to the possibility of involving multiple corporations incorporated in different jurisdictions. For example, in Inter-Tel Technologies, Inc v Linn Station Properties, LLC, 189 the Supreme Court of Kentucky was asked to pierce both the defendant corporation and its parent corporation to reach both the parent and grandparent shareholders. Addressing whether the court could pierce multiple corporate layers, the court stated the following:
"The Inter-Tel group insists that the parent and grandparent should not be viewed collectively but must be accorded separate recognition and only if Technologies' corporate veil is pierceable can the courts next proceed to pierce Inter-Tel's corporate veil. They offer no authority for this sequential piercing argument and neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has found such. There is, however, authority for piercing the veil of any related entity where the facts justify it. … The equitable doctrine of veil piercing cannot be thwarted by having two entities, rather than one, dominate the subsidiary and dividing the conduct between the two so that each can point the fi nger to some extent at the other." 190 While the court did not directly address the choice of law issue, it applied Kentucky law, the law of the state of incorporation of the defendant corporation, not just to the defendant corporation but also the parent corporation which was incorporated in Arizona.
